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APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
The Applicant-Appellant, Sarah Ann Anderson, seeks
compensation benefits against the Defendants for in;1iries she received on a ]Ob while working for the Defendant,
Barco of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Industrial Commission granted to the ApplicantAppPllant limited recover,
·•Pl

for permanent partial disability, as

l as gr,mting an early date of stabilization.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
rhe Applicant-Appellant requests this Court to reverse
• l1•r

, ,f r.he Industrial Commission and grant the Applicant-

1·'1' 1 ldnt a new hearing with regard to her injuries and compen-,,-:) t 1 <)[].

UF

The

··,1,1:--.,

place of employment on March

tion,

FAt_·rs

·,r1 =11n,1ll'/
1

i:e.

7,

which was originally denied,

'.::iht_'

1r·1 J1 1

n-::"'-{Ut-:'st ......

rr_"J

1

c·r)rnp•"Ti,

but prior to any hearing,

liability was admitted and payments were made.
The Applicant-Appellant developed further complica·
and problems with her inJuries.

The Applicant-Appellant thecc.

fore sought additional benefits.

Subsequent to a hear mg, tr.;

matter was referred to a Medical Panel,
Hess.

Dr.

consisting of Dr.

r"e·;

Hess completed his examination, and issued h1 s

cal Panel Report.

On April 21,

1981,

the Appllcant-Appelian:

filed a timely objection to the finding of the Medical Pane:
Report.
Shortly after the filing of the objection to the·"cal Panel Report,

Judge Foley of the Industrial Comm1ss1on

tacted the attorney for the Applicant-Appellant.

c0r-

At that t1c•'

Judge Foley indicated that he would be basing his ruling up;r
the treating physician Dr.
Report,

McQueen,

rather than a Medical Poe'

and therefore questioned the necessity for a heanng.

The treating physician Dr. McQueen had substantially greater
centage of the permanent partial d1sab1 l i ty attributable to·
accident,

and an additional

disability rating.

As a

1-l:

to 2 years of temporary

result of the statements by

the Applicant-Appellant did not request a hearing on her
tions to the Medical Panel Report.

F
•Ji:·

By letter- elated May f.

counsel for the Applicant-Appellant memor-1alu·ed '=ne pltJne
versation with Judge Foley and
-2-

thP requPsl

Further, copies were sent to the Applicantu:t

1 1
11ra1-1

dJ1

1

,w] I

as the attorney for the Defendants, Barco of

Insurance

1

On August 18,
F 0 c ts,

Cone

Fund.

1981

Judge Foley issued his Findings of

l us ions of La•1 and Order.

At that time, he adopted

the Medical Panel Report and entered an Order in accordance
rhe Applicant-Appellant than timely filed an Objec-

trere'111th.

t1on to the Findings of the Medical Panel, Petition for Review
dnd Request for Hearing on the Objections to the Medical Panel

RPprirt.
The subsequent hearing was held on April 16, 1982.

At

that time, present were Judge Joseph C. Foley, the ApplicantAppellant, her attorney, Mr. James R. Black, attorney for State
Insurance Fund and Barco of Utah, and Timothy Allen, Administrator ctnd Attorney for the Second Injury Fund.

Called to testify

about the hearing were Dr. W.E. Hess, who constituted the Medical
Panel, and Dr. Craig H. McQueen, the treating physician of the
'PP l icant -Appellant.
At the beginning of the hearing, the issue

was raised

as "o the propriety of the hearing by Mr. Timothy Allen.
fr
·d I

the

Applicant-Appellant indicated to Judge Foley the phone

U1dt
• ri

1

'"t

Counsel

l1Jdge F•Jley had made to him, and the necessity for the
/H

U1dt

time, Judge Foley told the attorney for the Ap-

c\ppellant that could not possibly have happened, but

f111ctlly c1cknoifdedged existence of the letter dated May 6, 1981.
c•1nr1'-'r,

the Administrative Law Judge indicated that in his entire
-3-

twenty yea rs,
Report.

he had on 1 y one,_, n' • t

Judge

d

of the hearing,
taken.

Dr.

but

Hess,

1

l

let

n(Jt

th"'

.1t

l

J ''

''

J

I

i I''-,]

',11

t !1

!\P.;1·11111

the Medical

r',

P

J.,

11
p1

Panel,

ri:?ce1vPd

nt

the tun(, ''l

hearing certain tests which he had not previously had arid hmade his opinion.

Said tests demonstrated the significant

jury and damage as testified to by the treating physiricHi
Judge Foley after the hearing continued to refuse
issue any Order in the case.
4 or 5 months

Injury Fund,

later.

Mr.

He then retired

Timothy Allen,

was duly appointed as an Administrative Lavi J ,c·1

for the Industrial Commission.
Allen,

attorney for the 0,.

On January 25,

1982, Mr.

formally attorney for the Second Injury Fund,

issue1

Order in the above entitled case adopting the Medical Pane:
port.

A Petition for Review was timely filed,

and the Indus·

Commission affirmed the Order previously entered.

Appllcan•-

Appellant than sought this timely revie•"1 in the Supreme

CVJ'

ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THAT IT WAS IMPROPER FOR JUDGE
FOLEY TO HAVE SAT AS
LAW JUDGE IN THE ABOVE CASE.

This point has two related but separate grounrls.
first

is that Judge Foley was disqualified,

not have heard the case.

dnd therf-'t0r•

The second is that his actin<) "-

minstrative Law Judge in this case constitutes a den1d.
process of the Applicant-Appellant.

-4-

,,,,,

in essence called the counsel for the ApplicantIi rlr-

1

"

that Judge Foley would never have contacted

lud•JP culey iJent on to deny the existence of the
1el1

'•Jh1ch counsel had sent memorializing the phone call.

finally

He

the existence of the letter, but indicated

e nad no• made the statements to counsel.

Thus, for an Applicant

off with a Judge who does not, or will not believe coun-

10

sel puts the Applicant at a great disadvantage.

Additionaly,

•he cicmonstra•ion of counsel's accuracy would leave a bias and
prtc]U(lice

in the Judge's mind against counsel for the Applicant,
to the Applicant.

oncl

fhe second concern over bias and prejudice statements
•he Administrative Law Judge concerns his ability to waive

·ne medical evidence in the case.

Judge Foley indicated that it

•rlS his policy to affirm the Medical Panel, and in his twenty
;ears had only once found the medical evidence as presented by
•rea•ing physicians, as opposed to the Medical Panel.

As such,

'h1s constitutes a bias and prejudice and leaning in favor of
Panel Reports, and challenges his ability to consider
11 .. arinqs

and evidence on an Objection to a Medical Panel Report.
Various Utah statutes and constitutional provisions

'i'i', /

,'1i "h r·eqard to disqualification for bias and prejudice.
,, • ,,f

" I

I'',,

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly makes

iuriice against a party or his attorney as a ground
Additionally, the Utah Constitution in

H.

13 deals with the disqualification of the Judges.

·1,,,,,,1, ,,, 1 ,·vp[i,-itly stated, the Utah Supreme Court has held

that constitution provision rPqu1t'f-".'S

Haslam v.

Morrison,

l'JU P . .Cd.

the Judge's statements,

11

c -'''

as well

I j I ,-j

tl

l

t •

dS his refusal

demonstrate bias and prejudice.

As such,

I

[ ,

t:u

/+ ':-;

I .

issue

this Court should

verse and remand the matter back do1rm for a new hearing ·wu.n
unbias and unprejudice Administrative Law Judge.
Both this Court and the United States Supreme Couo
have found and held that the due process clause of the Feder•
and State Constitution requires an impartial and unbiased
In Vali Convalescent and Care Inst.
Utah,

649 P.2d.

33

(Utah,

v.

Industrial Commiss10n

1982) a claim was made that it .1as

denied due process because the hearing concerning increase •r
wages to the Industrial Commission was heard by employees oi
Industrial Commission.

This Court did not there hold that su,:·

was denial of due process.

However,

the Court stated, at pauc

36-7:
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is
a basic requirement of due process."
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136,
75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).
"It has also become the prevailing view
that '[m]ost of the law concerning disqualification because of interest applies with equal flow
administrative
adjudicators."' Gibson v. Berryhill, 411
U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1698, 36
L.Ed.2d 488 (1973) (quoting in part K.
Davis, Administrative Law Text Section
12.04 (1972).
A biased decision maker
is not only comstitutionally prohibited,
"[b]ut our system of Law has alwdys endeavored to prevent even the probability
of unfairness." In re Murchison, )40 11.s.
at 136, 75 S.Ct:. at f025.
In Marshall v.
1610

( 1980)

Jerr1cn,

Jn,:.

the Supreme Court v1as conr·en11n,1

it

, , , r

I,

I'

j

it1· ,r

'Otandards Act and the administrative hearings con-

._ 11'_' II-?]

n •

Claim was made that based upon financial in-

1,-; the agency,

v1ho

•;1as

now due processed to have the

""'H i11•J done by the agency and that particular employee.

The

rourt there held that the financial interest was too remote to

itself with the due process clause.
J1d discuss
rhe

However, the Court

the due process rights to an impartial tribunal.

Court stated, at page 1613:
The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested
tribunal in both civil and criminal
cases.
This requirement of neutrality
in adjudicative proceedings safeguards
the two central concerns of procedural
due process, the prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the
promotion of participation and dialogue
by affected individuals in the decisionmaking process.
See Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 259-262, 266-267, 98 S.Ct.
1042. 1043. 1050-1052. 1053. 1054. 55
L.Ed.2d 252, (1978).
The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that life,
liberty, or property will not be taken
on the basis of an erroneous or distorted
conception of the facts of the law.
See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344,
96 S.Ct. 893, 907, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
At the same time, it preserves both the
appearance and reality of fairness, "generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been
done,"
Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172, 71 S.Ct. 624,
649, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring I, by ensuring that no person
will be deprived of his interests in the
absence of a proceeding in which he may
present his case with assurance that the
cJrbiter is not predisposed to find against
him.
The requirement of neutrality has been
Jealously guarded by this Court.
1nd1cated above, the due process concerns go to the

"'J

t-'I

il

1,._11

,,, unbiased and impartial tribunal, as well as the
-7-

appearance thereof.

In the case at

bar,

1t

is

,_ .,.,
1

there is sufficient problems 'JJlth this hedr-in<J ,1ff 1 c,,r '"
the actual due process rights of
However,

the ApplH·ant c1er·c· J,,n,,

based upon the statements and actions ot

strative Law Judge Foley,

tt 1e Adr"'"-

it is clear that there is a strur,,

appearance of impropriety.

1

Such also cal ls for the protect_

of the due process cl a use and a

reversal of this case.

Thu•.

i t is submitted that this case should be remanded for new
proceedings and hearings in the Industrial Commission 'tJith;
new hearing examiner.
POINT II:

IT WAS IMPROPER FOR JUDGE ALLEN
TO HAVE SAT AS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE IN THE ABOVE CASE.

This issue, concerning the Judge who ultimately
the Order in the above case,
The first,

again,

51 ,,_

concerns itself with t·,10 grow·,a-

is that Judge Allen was disqualified from

as the Administrative Law Judge.

The second ground is that

him to so act constitutes a denial of due process rights of
Applicant-Appellant.
In this case,

Judge Timothy Allen initially appeare,

as the Administrator and Attorney for the Defendant, Secona
Fund.

As such,

he entered appearances,

appeared and arguec

as the lawyer for an adverse party against this Appl icanr-'"''
lant in the hearings below.

Although it was proper for h•

be appointed as an Administrative Law Judge upon Judge Ful•
retirement,

it was

improper and the denial of due proces 0 f·

him to act in any way as an Adm1n1strative Law .Judge in tr.:•
The arguments as stated in the previous po1n•
similiarly apply to Judge Allen.
-8-

,,,1·;, .is ',·1Pll as his acting against this Applicant-Appellant,
ri·,1
J11

1

""'

bias and prejudice which should disqualify him.

'""'ii !·1.

there is a specific and explicit statute concernSection 78-7-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as

c, 11 1Pr1JeJ,

states,

in pertinent part:

Except by consent of all parties, no
judge
shall sit or act as such
in any action or proceeding:
(3)When he has been attorney or
counsel for either party in the action
or proceeding.
noted in Val1 Convalescent, supra, and Gibson v. Berryhill,
supra such concerns apply as well as to Judges as to AdministraLat"-'

Judges.

Thus,

it should be clear beyond per adventure

that it was improper for Judge Allen to have taken any action with
reqard to this case.

Therefore, there being no valid and proper

Order, this matter should be remanded to the Industrial Commiss1on

for another hearing with a new Administrative Law Judge.
The argument in point I with regard to the due process

claims apply with equal if not greater force in this instance.
The idea of

opposing counsel in a case, being elevated to the

bench to hear the case prior to the conclusion, in then rendering
':i1e decision,

shocks any sense of fair play.

Further, no matter

nnw fair or impartial the individual feels himself to be, the
orpearance of impropriety is just to great to allow.
:iar·shal v.
•I

Jerr1co,

Inc., supra,

the concern is both for the

""nee cinJ the reality of fairness.

1

1

r '""'"

J'O

As stated

Therefore, this lack of

a clear sense of injustice requires that the above

.cicter be remanded to the Industrial Commission for a new hear1fl·J ..nth a new Administrative Law Judge.
-9-

POINT

III:

THAT IT ',;VAS Ari Al3USF •If· l'1S
CRETION, ARBITRARY AND CAPHTCIOUS FOR THE IllLllJSTikAL i'ClMMISSION TO HAVE ADOPTED THE
MEDICAL PAUEL REPrJHT AS •JPPOSED
TO THE TREATIUG PHYSICIAU.

The Applicant-Appellant in this case is well

aviare

the long line of cases which indicate that it is the sole

d!'-

cretion of the Industrial Commission to find the facts with re:
to any disability rating, as well as the period of temporary·:
disability.

This Applicant-Appellant,

in the absence of a re.:.

with which to challenge the findings can not do so.

However,

there is one fact which does appear of record in this case.
were a number of relevant material tests that the Medical Pano_
did not have when it rendered its decision.

These were,

hm1e·;-

in the possession of the treating physician Dr. McQueen who te:
fied.

Thus, both the Medical Panel and the Industrial Cornmis::

ignored pertinent information on the Applicant in
their rating as well as the date of stabilization.

As such,

constitutes and arbitrary and capricious action to not take tc.•
into account.
Claim is also made here that the lack of any recoro
should entitle this Applicant-Appellant to a new hearing so
if there is a decision adverse to her,
view to this Court.

she can bring it for

As indicated by way of Affidav1 t, as

•·1<?'

the filing of a statement of the proceedings based upon Rule
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

the reporter for

ing, Mr. Dean Ce1ly, was unable to find any of his notes
cord1ngs of the hearing which caused there to be no
Thus,

there was no fault of the Applicant-Appellant
-10-

and

corney in the lack of record with regard to the above case.

Fur-

,,,er, there •>1as a statement of the proceedings filed by Applicant-

•rGellant's counsel with regard to various matters upon which a
is requested.

However, the factual matters concerning

the medical evidence can not be ascertained.

This Court should

therefore reverse and remand this matter for a new hearing before
a new Administrative Law Judge.

Such an action, based upon the

lack of a record, was done in the case of Reliance National Life
Insurance Company v. Caine. 439 P.2d 283, 20 Utah.2d 427 (Utah).
CONCLUSION
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the above
entitled matter should be remanded to the Industrial Commission
for new hearings and proceedings with regard to the ApplicantAppellant's claim, and that said should be done before another
and neutral and detached Administrative Law Judge.

It is sub-

mitted that each of the six grounds asserted above, the disqualification of both Judge Foley and Judge Allen, the denial
of due process to the Applicant-Appellant by Judge Foley and
Judge Allen acting in the case, as well as the arbitrary and
capricious findings of the Industrial Commission, and finally
the lack of any transcript with regard to the medical issues,
requires such an action.
DATED this

of July, 1984.
ROBERTS & ROBERTS

By

-11-

r

L

I . .._,

\

THOM D. ROBERTS
Attorney for Applicant-Appellant
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